From Bandora to Bandra

Bandra and The Marathas

1660-1739
Article by: Denis Rodrigues

Initially the Portuguese had to walk a tightrope between the Marathas and the Moghuls with each in turn retaliating because they saw the other side as being favoured. First they had to placate the Mughals after Shivaji raided Surat in 1664 and “passed happily to his Kingdom always keeping to our border in that transit, with the idea of availing himself of our territory in the event of an emergency” Piss n58 p 152 (citing Livro das moncoes No 30 p 143). Later the Mughal armies were allowed to march through Portuguese territory en route to attacking Sambhaji who then retaliated after the Mughals withdrew. At a still later stage, the Mughals in turn turned hostile because of perceived support to the Marathas. As the Maratha state grew stronger they took over all the territory bordering the Portuguese holdings from Daman to Chaul. The relations were in three phases of increasing hostility. 1) Initially, in the 1660s under Shivaji, they claimed rights over some of these lands which were held by the previous rulers (eg Chauth and Gaonkhandi) and which were given to them by these rulers. (eg Moghul farmans ) 2) In the next phase, there were direct attacks and temporary occupation of some lands in retaliation of perceived support to the mughals but still related to demands for tribute under Sambhaji 1683-1724 2) In the final phase, under Baji Rao’s leadership, demands escalated to include freedom of religion and culminated in campaign to remove Portuguese presence completely.

1660s

In Shivaji’s reign no direct threat to Salcette though Shivaji captured the surrounding Bijapur territory including Bhiwandi and Kalyan. He also set up a naval base at Kalyan. He collected ‘gaokhandi’ – a form of quit-rent over some villages (Saibana) near Bassein for some years.. Payments began around 1665-66. The Portuguese themselves collected the ‘trench’ and notified the maratha subedars – in this case a Moro Trimbal Pradhan - to collect it rather than allow the Marathas directly to do so. Piss n116 p53 N.B. Not ‘chauth’ which he claimed in area near Daman.

1683

Sambhaji retaliated after Portuguese allowed a Moghul army through its territory and threatened Salcette. British records say that ’ …Cambar, Tullojah and Colwah (were) taken .. and expect every hour to hour to hear of Thanah and Salcette being in his possession. Piss n 478 p 125 (Bombay to Surat, 28 November 1683, Factory Records) Hath taken most of the Portuguese took much territory north of Bassein like Mahim, Quelme..Soparah and burnt Sabage.. is landed on Carinja ..we can see no hopes for them, but the Moghul’s army falling down into the Konkan. Piss n 47 p 126 (Surat to East India Company 25 January 1684, Factory Records Surat Vol 91) Storia do Mogor ???

1684

Treaty on 4 February agreeing to Gaokhandi in Bassein and Chauth in Daman . When Sambhaji had to return to the Deccan to face the Moghuls Karanja retaken by Portuguese on 19 September

Problems with the Moghuls

1690

Moghul claim that Portuguese favoured Rajaram and ‘officials of Rajaram, many of them have kept their families in the Portugeuse territory’. Retaliated by attacking fort of Bassein and set fire to a church outside the walls.. Piss p159

1693-94

Letter of Viceroy; 7 January 1694 Siddy of Danda (a vassal of the Moghuls) is preparing 80 warships to attack the island of Salcette, in the jurisdiction of Bassein. The news further says that the tillers and the residents of the villages, with the fear of the imminent attack have deserted the villages and have taken shelter in the forts. Immediately on receipt of these news I ordered Belchoir de Amaral de Menezes, chief captain of the Northern Fleet, to go in support of those shores and to impeded any attempt at landing thereon made by the enemy. It is confirmed to me by many persons coming from there, that the aid had reached in the appropriate time and that had I not been careful to dispatch it promptly the enemy would, undoubtedly, succeed… Piss p 161 (Livro das Moncoes No 57) Cited in

1717

Baji Rao intent to dominate the Province of the North and took Kalyan and Bhiwandi from the Moghuls.

1717-1718

Demand of one-tenth of the revenue of the province, by virtue of a gift made to their King by the Moghul King under a farman (order) Rejected because not applicable to Portuguese territory. Piss p 169 ‘This reply resulted in no hostilities or any considered move…’ Piss p169

Under Baji Rao, the Marathas mow coveted the North Province “The lands forming this province were wide, most fertile …They were the best patrimony of the State on account of the quit-rent and revenue received from the factories within, as well as on account of the income pocketed by the vassals of His Majesty and by the tenants of those lands. …The island of Salcette which is to the south of the Fort of Bassein was the most precious terrain of the region for the quality of the land, as well as, for the security afforded by her rivers around it. But the jurisdictions of Bassain, Saibana, Sabap, Manori, Asseri, Tarapore and Daman were open lands bordering upon the dominion of Marathas on the side of Kalyan and Bhiwandi. They were therefore unable to resist against the invasion of the Marathas who repeatedly invaded them for the loot of cattle and other property of agriculturalists. Fear and feelings of necessity were created among these agriculturalists to leave their villages for those in Maratha territory…the Province of the North …came down to a shameful decline owing to the repeated hostilities by the Marathas..Piss p 170

1724 Peace Treaty

1730

Fresh outbreak of hostilities: letter of Governor of Bombay to Krishnarao Mahadev, Fauzdar of Kalyan re “hostilities from either side causing great damage to the poor residents and interruption to the trade of our State” and offering to mediate. Baji Rao replied: We have captured their lands. We shall continue to capture them…Your attention is mercantile which requires you to be good to all…. Piss n 11 p172-173 citing Foreign Idiom records

Direct Threat to Salcette Invasion of Province and planned ” to pass to the island of Salcette that was till then, unaffected by the invasions.” Portuguese strengthened the defences with warships and doubled garrisons of forts especially Thana. But still too weak against the forces opposing them, so appealed to British for help ,who prepared a force of 700 men because of which the ” enemies gave up the plan to pass to the island of Salcette”. Piss p 174 Letter of Viceroy to King 19 Jan 1634 “The Britishers helped us promptly in the defense of the island of Salcette which was saved on account of that help£ Livro das Moncoes No 99 p 247: Piss n 13 p 174

1732

Peace treaty brokered by English. Marathas had two major demands: permission to build temples and payment of tribute , neither of which as granted

1737-39: The Final Phase and conquest of Salcette

First meeting of disaffected Hindus with Baji Rao at Satara re problems with Portuguese and asking or intervention. (According to Piss in 1722-23 but more probably 32-33 ??) Rfr @Gangaji Naik, Babuji Naik and Janardhan Naik..by caste Pathare… residents of Wanre (Bandra)…came to Satara in AD 1722-23 to meet Peshwa Bajirao… They informed the Peshwa .. that due to the discontinuance of their watans, they (Gangaji and others) had left the Province and were at the time residing in the Province of Kalyan… Return every year with information Sanad dated 1741-42 (Selections from the Satara Rajas and the Peshwas Diaries III. Balaji Peshwa Rao Vol I, p5-7) Piss n p 186

1737

Army of Shankarji Keshav and Chimnaji Bhivrao sent to Bassein with Gangaji and Shivaji (as guides ?) Army of Khandoji Mankar and Ramchandra Hari to Thana with Babuji Murarji and Narayanji Piss n 29 p 186 Selection from the Satara Raja and the Peshwas Diaries III, Bajirao Peshwa Vol UI P 5-7 See also Sashtichi Bakhar and Uttar Konkanacha Prachin Itihas which speaks of conspiracy from 1729 with an Antaji Raghunath Kavle

Various villages from it (Salsette) and from the town (Thana) who were in league with the Marathas, introduced the latter in the territory, treacherously disguised as farmers… (Letter of the People of Bassein, Oriente Portugues Vol III, p 280) Piss n29 p 186 6 April captured dry pass to Thana and Thana fort was occupied on 8th April. Army broke up into two columns to Versova and Bandra

On 9th April the enemies continued the hostilities in and attacks on the same island of Salsette. They destined 500 men to attack the fort that defended the part of Versova…. The same happened at that very moment in the public house of Bandra (Bandora) that was garrisoned by priests of the Company, its masters. This house was protected by two moon-shaped out-works. These priests brought men from Bombay – at their own cost. However a little later thereafter Lieutenant General Caetano De Souza Pereira, a noble of known valour, reached the Fort of Versova with an aid of 30 soldiers and Chief Captain of Salsette, Joao de Souza Ferras, an official of good judgment reached Bandra with an equal number of men. They were sent by General Dom Luis Bottelho from Karanja. These precautions ensured better security of that fort. Piss p. 189

They continued the attacks on Bandra and Versova p 191

All the while the struggle of defence if the strong house of Bandora (Bandra) continued firmly. It was surrounded persistently by enemies since 10th April. The enemies when found their initial plan to scale the walls frustrated, with a considerable loss, took up top attack the two small watch points that guarded the fortress. This attack was carried out by two persons of artillery. However, the Chief Captain Joao de Souza Ferra who could show the enemies the valour he was gifted with, promptly made the enemies see his disposition and consistency in the remaining operations that followed. He, availing himself of the facility of carrying the necessary aid from Bombay, afford by the nearness of the island and the good will of the Britons on account of the ready payment and an account of their desire to avoid the Marathas in close vicinity, ordered out, from there, some artillery of heavy caliber and other material the he felt to be useful for the defence. With counter attacks he enhanced the damage to the enemies. He perturbed them by artificial fire and frustrated them in their last resort of mining operations by planting counter mines. The enemies suffered a heavy mortality during the course of fifty six days of the siege and having no hope to better the lot withdrew on 5th June. During the process of withdrawal, the set fire to the Church of St. Andre, Chapel of Nossa Senhora de Monserrate and to the entire village. This did not cause loss to defenders except six dead and some wounded Piss pp 199-200 Check Oriente Portugues Vol III @p 223

The consistency that the enemies experienced in the defence of the small and tenuous fortifications of Bandora (Bandra) and Versova, in the same island made them realize that the success they had in capturing the forts of the firm land was not due to the lack of valour of the defenders but was due to many other faults such as unprepared ness for an abruptly and unexpected war with no aid as that received by Bandora and Versova which had sea ports which facilitated communication with Bombay and Bassein. Piss p 203

1738-1739

Bandora could have been lost to the Marathas if it had not been timely supported with men and ammunition by the Englishmen who were also interested in its defence. The book Cartas e Ordens (Letters and Orders No. 23 p 58) gives a list of arms, ammunition and other war material supplied to Bandra By the Englishmen of Bombay for the defence of the fort. This list also gives the list of the persons who were present in the strong house of Bandra on 13th February 173 {P iss n19- 20 p 243-44 See Xerox of pp244-45

There are references to British decision to provide support in April 1737 A resolution of 28-3-’37 said: “It is therefore agreed that we send them (the Portuguese) an officer and fifty men, if the place (Bandra) is found tenable….” (Selections, Home Series, II, p. 68). Ranwar Source p 28

BUT Marathas entered Salcette only on 6th April though an attack seemed to have been expected. More probably the Resolution is of 1738 as appears from below. There is reference to charges for the men in 1738 though it could refer only to pending charges

The 18th January 1739 the account charges for Bandra from 1st August 1738 to 31st December following amounting to Rs. 9795-3-64, translated into Portuguese, are laid before the Board, when the President takes notice that the Portuguese Government had not even cleared the arrears of the four preceding months from 1st April to 31st July amounting to Rs. 6,893-2-21. [Bom Gov. Consultation, 18 Jan. 1739 Pub Diary 13 of 1738-39, 21] Cambell p. 201-202 Ranwar Source p 17.

A stronger argument for the British not having been involved in the actual fighting is the correspondence between Khodaji Mankar, commanding general in Salcette, and the British in 1739 regarding the Maratha intention to take Bandra and warning the British to withdraw else relations would be strained if it came to actual fighting:

Next day (19th January, 1739) the President communicated to the Board a letter received from Kondaji Mankar the commanding officer on the island of Salsette for the Marathas, the substance of which is to acquaint him that Chimnaji brother to Bajirav has reduced Mahim (Kalve), Kellum (Kalve), and Dahanu and was bent on subduing the remainder of the country. That this early and frank advice was given us of his intention to attack Vesava and Bandra, that we might withdraw our succours from the latter place where they are in garrison and which they look on as their right and belonging to their domain, and even offering on the reduction of Bandra if we are jealous of a troublesome neighbourhood, to agree to its demolition. In case of our continuance in Bandra he says he cannot answer for the consequences that may result to the peaceable correspondence we have hitherto maintained with them. Another possibility is that the Portuguese reinforcements went to the battery fortifications at the foot of the hill and the English were at St. Anne’s. Hence all the fighting would have been at the battery. The Marathas also agreed to the demolition of the fortifications if that was what the British wanted

The British however decided to ” maintain and continue our succours to the fortification of Bandra, which we judge may hold out against the Marathas unless they bring cannons against it. In such case the place being no longer tenable, that care shall be taken to secure the retreat of our people and a mine be sprung for its being rendered unserviceable to the Marathas. Of this the President is desired to advise the General of the North and at the same time of the indispensable necessity of demolishing the battery at the foot of the hill of Senora de Monte on Salsette which entirely commands the channel that gives passage into the Mahim river.